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Abstract
How does major policy change come about? This article identifies and rectifies
weaknesses in the conceptualization of innovative policy change in the Advocacy
Coalition Framework. In a case study of policy belief change preceding an innova-
tive reform in the German subsystem of old-age security, important new aspects of
major policy change are carved out. In particular, the analysis traces a transition
from one single hegemonic advocacy coalition to another stable coalition with a
transition phase between the two equilibria. The transition phase is characterized
(a) by a bipolarization of policy beliefs in the subsystem and (b) by state actors
with shifting coalition memberships due to policy learning across coalitions or due
to executive turnover. Apparently, there are subsystems with specific character-
istics (presumably redistributive rather than regulative subsystems) in which one
hegemonic coalition is the default, or the “normal state”. In these subsystems, po-
larization and shifting coalition memberships seem to interact to produce coalition
turnover and major policy change. The case study is based on discourse network
analysis, a combination of qualitative content analysis and social network analysis,
which provides an intertemporal measurement of advocacy coalition realignment at
the level of policy beliefs in a subsystem.
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1 Introduction
How does major policy change come about? Existing evidence in line with the Advocacy
Coalition Framework (ACF) suggests that policy subsystems are structured around com-
peting advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1998). They are stable for long time periods, often
much more than a decade (Zafonte and Sabatier 2004; Jenkins-Smith et al. 1991). This
equilibrium guarantees policy stability and is only interrupted when external perturba-
tions cause coalition members to refine their internal belief systems significantly (Sabatier
and Weible 2007: 193). When this happens, major policy change becomes likely.
Yet this perspective leaves important questions unanswered: what exactly happens
when coalition members adjust their belief systems – do they leave their coalition and join
the political opponent? How does the structure of a subsystem change when belief change
occurs? Is there a transition phase, and what does it look like? Does the competition
between two or more stable coalitions constitute the “normal state” of policy-making
irrespective of institutional context across political systems? Or could this be a peculiarity
of pluralist or other institutional contexts, and there are in fact subsystems where only
one hegemonic coalition is the rule?
In this article, an empirical case study is presented which sheds light on these open
questions. Using a methodological advancement based on a combination of social network
analysis and qualitative data, the belief similarity networks of actors in the German policy
subsystem of old-age security are mapped over time. In particular, I posit that hegemony
of a single coalition may be the rule rather than the exception in some types of policy
subsystems. In these cases, a polarization into competing coalitions and the shift back to a
single coalition with new members and new beliefs necessarily occurs before major policy
change can take place. This conflictual transition phase is guided by two interrelated
processes: belief polarization and learning across coalitions.
The paper strives to achieve four goals: opening the black box and describing the pro-
cesses predating major policy change; demonstrating how consensus and polarization may
alternate to produce policy stability or change; discussing the relevance of the “discursive
layer” of subsystem politics for policy-making; and the introduction of methodological
tools which will enable researchers to tackle a host of new research questions centered
around these themes.
The article is structured as follows: The second section briefly reviews the literature
on the ACF and connects the overarching theme of policy change to related approaches
in the public policy literature. The second and third sections also point out that our
understanding of policy learning and policy change is still limited and suggest that new
insights can be gained by analyzing the temporal pattern of subsystem change at the dis-
cursive level. To meet this challenge, a methodology called “discourse network analysis”
is described in the fourth section. It draws on social network analysis and is capable of
measuring belief change in subsystems over time. An original dataset on German pension
politics is presented, which was compiled using the software Discourse Network Analyzer,
and background information on the case study is provided. The next section presents the
results of the empirical analysis, and the subsequent section carves out some observable
mechanisms and reconnects these findings to the ACF. Finally, the conclusion proposes
pathways for future research and recapitulates on the discourse network approach as a
means to tackle these open questions.
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2 Advocacy coalitions and major policy change
As we know from the ACF, political actors in a policy subsystem can be classified into
coalitions of competing policy beliefs (Sabatier 1998). They have complex belief sys-
tems at several layers of intensity and alterability (cf. Henry et al. 2011) and coordinate
within but not across coalitions (Weible 2005; Ingold 2011). Advocacy coalitions are
usually stable over time (for a review, see Zafonte and Sabatier 2004), and they are po-
larized particularly in conflictual subsystems (Jenkins-Smith et al. 1991). Administrative
agencies have more moderate positions than interest groups and thus often act as pol-
icy brokers or intermediaries between coalitions (Sabatier 1998). Scientific evidence is
frequently employed in order to back one’s own policy positions (Sabatier 1987). New in-
formation or exogenous shocks have been identified as the main drivers of policy learning
within and across coalitions, and policy learning has been found to cause policy change
(Sabatier 1998).
In this perspective, the actual processes of policy learning and policy change largely
remain a black box (cf. Mintrom and Vergari 1996; Nohrstedt 2010). Especially the very
transition from one stable advocacy coalition structure to a new stable advocacy coalition
structure has not been sufficiently explored within the ACF. Does one coalition simply
discard previously held beliefs instantly upon receipt of new information and join the
political opponent? Is the existence of two or more stable coalitions really the “normal
state” of policy-making, or is the emergence of polarized coalitions merely a temporally
confined piece in the puzzle of policy change?
Other scholars have pointed out that subsystems may be structured around a single
hegemonic coalition instead of two or more competing coalitions. Baumgartner and Jones
(1991), for example, argue that the “normal state” of politics is rather non-conflictual
because one hegemonic coalition can clearly determine the course of political action. This
centralized policy network structure is stable until previous “policy losers” are able to
change the policy image and shift the venue of policy-making, leading to feedback loops
and eventually culminating in a punctuation of the policy equilibrium. According to this
theory, policy change is rare and, if it occurs, strong (cf. Jones and Baumgartner 2005).
Similarly, Hall (1993) argues that dominant policy paradigms structure subsystems for
long periods of time. When actors realize that various core aspects and more periph-
eral aspects of a policy lose their credibility, the policy paradigm is replaced by a new
paradigm.
This contrast between the ACF and related theoretical frameworks discloses impor-
tant questions: may there be two alternative types of equilibria in policy subsystems –
one of them characterized by multiple competing coalitions, and the other one charac-
terized by transitions from one hegemonic coalition through a rewiring phase to another
hegemonic coalition? Should this hold true, we must ask: what institutional, temporal or
cultural factors can explain whether competition between coalitions is a cross-sectional
or a temporal pattern?
A vague hint is provided by Sabatier and Weible (2007: 199f.), who allow for the
possibility that coalitions may operate in different ways if one compares corporatist con-
sensus democracies with majoritarian-pluralist polities. They concede that “the higher
the degree of consensus required, the more incentive coalitions have to be inclusive (rather
than exclusive), to seek compromise and share information with opponents, and generally
to minimize devil shift” (Sabatier and Weible 2007: 200). However, the implications for
subsystem structure are in principle uncertain. Sabatier and Weible (2007: 200) suggest
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that “advocacy coalitions will tend to have fewer actors, and the norms of compromise
will create incentives for moderates to broker deals across coalitions.” The analysis below
sheds light on this question and adds a temporal perspective on subsystem change in a
corporatist setting before major policy change takes place.
3 The discursive layer of subsystem politics
Advocacy coalitions are composed of two distinct “layers” which can be measured em-
pirically: beliefs and coordination. The original version of the ACF focuses largely on
the belief systems of political actors and how they structure policy subsystems (Sabatier
1987). Accordingly, early analyses of advocacy coalitions examined beliefs of actors rather
than coordination among them over long time periods by means of content analysis (e.g.,
Jenkins-Smith et al. 1991). Following the proposition of Sabatier (1987: 664), “it seems
preferable to allow the actors to indicate their belief systems (via questionnaires and
content analysis of documents) and then empirically examine the extent to which these
change over time.”
Only after subsequent modifications of the ACF, coordination between actors in coali-
tions was established as the second layer of structures that can be measured empirically
in policy subsystems: actors “both (a) share a set of normative and causal beliefs and (b)
engage in a non-trivial degree of co-ordinated activity over time” (Sabatier 1998: 103).
More recently, coordination has become a central interest of advocacy coalition scholars,
and the policy network approach (Pappi and Henning 1998; Schneider 1992) and social
network analysis are now frequently applied in order to delineate coalitions in terms of
information exchange and other relations between actors (Ingold 2011; Lubell et al. 2012).
Belief systems, however, are still the primary theoretical factor that structures coali-
tion membership and subsystems and which distinguishes the ACF from the vast liter-
ature on policy networks that has evolved since the early 1970s. Coordination is con-
ditioned and structured by belief systems of actors (Sabatier 1998), and more recent
analyses could confirm that both are indeed closely associated (Ingold 2011 and Weible
2010; but see Leifeld and Schneider 2012).
Moreover, while coordination may be an interesting feature of coalitions, question-
naires with retrospective questions about coalition structure would fail to generate any
meaningful results due to recall errors, hindsight bias and similar problems (Finney 1981;
Geweke and Martin 2002; Janson 1990; van der Vaart et al. 1995), especially when actors
are asked to reconstruct historical relations that may have existed more than a decade
ago. Unless repeated questionnaires are employed, content analysis still seems to be the
only viable way of measuring advocacy coalitions over periods of a decade or more.
For these reasons, and in line with Jenkins-Smith et al. (1991), I propose an opera-
tionalization of the belief-related components of the ACF based on content analysis of
newspaper articles.1 More specifically, I measure what Sabatier (1998: 116 f.) calls “pol-
icy core policy preferences” in his qualification of the Advocacy Coalition Framework –
the second most specific and most alterable normative type of policy beliefs (out of four
1Other kinds of archival data could have been used alternatively. For example, Fisher et al. (2013)
extract issue stances of actors from testimonies of legislators and interest groups in the U.S. Congress.
News media data presumably capture a wider variety of political actors while Congressional testimonies
may be more confined to actors involved in the legislative process. On the other hand, media data may
be more selective in favor of mediagenic actors. More research is required on how these different political
arenas overlap in terms of their sets of actors.
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types: deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs, policy core policy preferences, and secondary
aspects). They “are broad in scope (affecting virtually all members of the subsystem),
involve very salient beliefs, and have been the source of long-term conflict” (Sabatier
1998: 117). These policy preferences are geared towards moving future policy-making in
a subsystem into a general normative direction. Most importantly, however, they “consti-
tute the principal ‘glue’ holding a coalition together” (Sabatier 1998: 117) and can thus
directly serve to operationalize the most crucial aspect of advocacy coalitions: normative
belief similarity regarding policy instruments.
The articulation of policy core policy preferences is a complex, relational phenomenon.
Actors reveal their preferences in the media or other arenas and thus other actors feel
encouraged to support them or reveal their opposition. As such, this articulation of
normative beliefs can be subsumed under the more general notion of “discourse” (cf.
Schmidt 2010) and can thus be understood as a “discursive layer” of subsystem politics.
In order to measure coalitions based on these data, some transformations are required.
The following section briefly outlines the methodology of discourse network analysis,
an approach which combines qualitative content analysis with social network analysis
in order to visualize the development of coalitions over time. Social network analysis
seems like a natural choice for modeling policy debates because political discourse is
an inherently relational phenomenon. Discourse network analysis has been employed to
study a political conflict about software patents in the European Union (Leifeld and
Haunss 2012) and the formation of consensus around climate policy-making in the U.S.
Congress (Fisher et al. 2013, 2012).
4 The methodology of discourse network analysis
With the advent of digital technology, full-text archives of newspapers, parliamentary
testimony or other venues are readily available as a source of information. They fill a gap
where elite interviews fail, as is the case in analyses of policy debates. Unfortunately, raw
text data are unstructured and thus require an elaborate methodology to draw useful
conclusions from them. For precisely this purpose, I created a free-to-use Java-based
software called Discourse Network Analyzer in order to facilitate the qualitative coding
process and the conversion of actors’ statements into network data (Leifeld 2013; see
http://www.philipleifeld.com). In this software, text data can be imported, state-
ments of actors can be manually encoded, and the resulting actor or concept map can be
exported as one out of several network types.
4.1 Affiliation networks
The following descriptive model of political discourse is adopted. There are political
actors who make statements in the media (or whatever text source is used). A statement
is a text portion where an actor utters his or her policy preferences in a positive or in
a negative way. For example, an actor can either support or reject a policy instrument.
For reasons of generality, policy instruments which are proposed by actors are called
“concepts” in the following framework. A statement is thus a text portion containing (1)
an actor, (2) a concept, and (3) the binary information about support or opposition.
More formally, let A = {a1, a2 · · · am} be the set of actors in the data set, and let
C = {c1, c2 · · · cn} denote the set of concepts in the data set. The coding procedure
furthermore involves a dummy variable for agreement or disagreement of an actor with
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a concept. This set of relations can be defined as R = {r1, r2 · · · rl} with l = 2 (for the
two relations: agreement and disagreement).2 Since a particular emphasis is placed on
the longitudinal analysis of discourse, the date of a statement is another critical aspect.
Time is actually continuous, but for the sake of simplicity it will be modeled as being
discrete in this context. Thus, T = {t1, t2 · · · tk} denotes the set of discrete time steps,
for example the set of years in which statements are made.
The level of analysis is the statement. Whenever a statement occurs, a relation
between an actor and a concept is inferred from this statement. This relation is modeled





The aff superscript indicates that this is an affiliation network. There is one such bipartite
graph for each agreement relation. It is possible to collapse the positive and the negative
affiliation graph into a single multiplex network. One such graph can be constructed
for each time slice t. As the graph is bipartite, it exhibits the property that only edges
between actors and concepts are allowed, not within the set of actors or within the set of
concepts:
{a, a′} /∈ Eaffr,t ∧ {c, c′} /∈ Eaffr,t (2)
In this condition, a denotes an actor and a′ another actor; similarly, c denotes a concept
and c′ an arbitrary second concept.
4.2 Congruence networks
Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to establish whether two actors actually exhibit high
or low degrees of belief overlap, given the highly complex graphical representation of the
affiliation network. One might not only be interested in how actors relate to concepts,
but also in how far coalitions emerge from this structure. The basic idea is that the
more concepts two actors agree (or both disagree) on, the more similar they are in terms
of preferences or concepts in the discourse. Therefore, it is straightforward to move
from a bipartite affiliation graph to an adjacency graph where actors are connected to
other actors and where the edge weight between these actors represents the number of
common concepts. The overall topology of the resulting congruence network can be used
as a map of the discourse where clusters of actors represent advocacy coalitions. This is
true because these preferences constitute the “stickiest glue” between coalitions (Sabatier
and Weible 2007). The congruence network provides an intuitive way of conceptualizing
and measuring coalitions at the ideational level (of course ignoring material aspects like
information exchange relationships as analyzed by Leifeld and Schneider 2012).
Actor congruence networks are created as follows. Let Gat be an adjacency graph




with edges et ∈ E(Gat ).
2The l index is needed later in equation 6 to sum over the different relations. For this reason,
agreement and disagreement are not merely hardcoded as R = {r1, r2}.
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Edges have a weight attached to them, such that a denotes the source vertex of an
edge, a′ the target vertex and wt the weight of the edge between source and target. Actors
do not have a subscript t because the model assumes they are present in all time periods.
Only the presence or absence of statements (or edges) may vary over time.
∀et : et = {a, a′, wt} (4)
Wt is the set of weights, and wt(a, a
′) ∈ Wt denotes the edge weight between a and a′.
Edge weights are computed as follows. In the affiliation graph of equation 1, a neighbor
is an adjacent vertex of another vertex. Neighbors of concepts must be in the set of
actors and vice-versa, as required by equation 2. The set of neighbors of vertex a in the
affiliation network is denoted as NGaffr,t(a). It contains all concepts actor a refers to in the
affiliation matrix. Hence it is defined as the set of concepts that are incident with an
edge containing a as a source or target vertex. Er,t(a) denotes the set of edges incident
with a.
NGaffr,t(a) := C ∈ Eaffr,t (a) (5)






In equation 6, the edge weight between a and a′ is determined by computing the inter-
section of their sets of neighbors and counting the elements of this intersection. This is
done for both relations (agreement and disagreement), and both counts are summed up.
In other words, the edge weight between two actors is the number of concepts they both
refer to in the same (i. e., positive or negative) way.
The interpretation is straightforward: the edge weight can be interpreted as a mea-
sure of similarity in the discourse. The more similar the policy preferences of two actors,
the higher their edge weight. Accordingly, cohesive subgroups in the graph can be inter-
preted as coalitions while sparse connections between these clusters reflect policy belief
divergence.
4.3 Threshold values
In a visual inspection of the resulting network diagrams, threshold values can be imposed:
in order to avoid wrong inference due to coding errors or random behavior/noise of actors
concerning their statements, the lowest edge weights can be ignored during the analysis
by imposing a threshold value on the edge weight. The cut-off value can be increased in
a step-wise fashion until the structure of the discourse network becomes visible. There
is essentially a trade-off between allowing too much noise (and therefore drowning in too
much artificial complexity) and filtering out too much relevant information by setting
the threshold value too high. The optimal threshold value is usually determined in an
explorative way because the degree of noise critically depends on the size of the time slice,
the number of concepts and other factors which vary between empirical applications. Such
a threshold value, however, is only required for the visual inspection of the network but
not for subgroup analyses based on structural similarity, which are also presented below.
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4.4 The normalization of edge weights
Quite obviously, actors who make more statements than other actors are likely to be cen-
tral in the resulting congruence network. This affects particularly governmental actors
who are officially in charge of dealing with a problem, for example the relevant govern-
mental agency. One way to correct for this potential bias is to employ a normalization
(for more details and a discussion, see Leifeld 2011). The normalization of an edge weight,
Φ(wt), is the edge weight divided by the average number of concepts both actors refer to
in the affiliation network – either in a positive or in a negative way (hence the union of







(∣∣∣NGaffr=1,t(a) ∪NGaffr=2,t(a)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣NGaffr=1,t(a′) ∪NGaffr=2,t(a′)∣∣∣) (7)
4.5 Additional specifications and matrix notation
Analogous methods can be employed to create a concept congruence network, a conflict
network and dynamic discourse networks. As these network types are not required for the
specific analysis presented in this article, the reader is referred to the detailed discussion
in Leifeld (2011).
There are two mathematical foundations of social network analysis: graph theory and
matrix algebra. The basic model described here was presented using graph theory, but
the same logic can be expressed in matrix notation. For the sake of clarity, the basic
model is described in matrix notation in appendix A.
5 The dataset
A case study about German pension politics is presented below. Using the software
Discourse Network Analyzer, 7,249 statements of political actors between January 1993
and May 2001 were encoded. This time period roughly covers the decade before the
Riester reform, an instance of major policy change in this subsystem. The law was
passed in May 2001.
5.1 The coding procedure
The dataset was created in three steps. First, the source was selected. Three newspa-
pers were available as digital full-text archives. Two of them are known to be politically
moderate. Both newspapers correspond to the “quality press” criterion (Barranco and
Wisler 1999; Koopmans 1996; Kriesi 1995): they have a wide circulation and are politi-
cally moderate and reputable. In order to avoid potential problems with double coverage
of events, only one of these newspapers was eventually selected: Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung (FAZ). Media bias may be a minor issue for a cross-sectional analysis. Unless
the newspaper changes its political orientation over time, however, the potential bias
should be constant and longitudinal changes in the discursive structure should still be
observable.
Second, the population of articles had to be defined. Only the “politics” and “busi-
ness” section of the newspaper were considered; feuilleton pages and other sections were
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excluded because their journalistic style was more normative and arguments were of-
ten implied rather than made explicit. The search term “*rente*” (the German word
for “pension” surrounded by wildcards) was used to identify 1,879 potentially relevant
articles.
Third, all articles were read, and their contents were manually encoded. Whenever
a political actor revealed his policy preferences about a policy instrument related to
the pension system, this was coded as a statement (according to the definition given
above).3 Individuals and organizations were considered simultaneously. In the final
analysis, only statements made by organizational actors were retained because important
persons without an organizational affiliation were not present. If an actor or a concept was
not already in the dataset, it was subsequently added to the list. While the coding was
mainly inductive (with a certain number of deductively pre-identified solution concepts
from the theoretical literature), a multi-pass coding strategy was employed, i.e., the coder
had to navigate back and forth between the statements in order to ensure a consistent
way of coding.
A single researcher encoded the articles, and a second individual checked the codes
of the other researcher but did not code any data independently. This coding procedure
(1) increased the reliability compared to a single-coder strategy and (2) was less labor-
and hence cost-intensive than independent coding of the same articles by two separate
individuals. While intercoder reliability could not be explicitly checked with this coding
procedure, other measures were taken to ensure a high quality of the dataset: as men-
tioned above, all codes were reviewed by a second researcher, and in cases of disagreement,
codes were discussed and a consensual solution was found. Moreover, an algorithm was
implemented into the software which can identify self-contradictions of actors over time
(that is, an actor refers to a concept in a positive way somewhere and in a negative way
somewhere else). This information was used to detect and fix inconsistencies. In most
cases, however, statements were made in an unambiguous way. Finally, a full-text search
based on regular expressions was employed to find statements which had been previously
overlooked. All of these measures indicated that the coding was very consistent. The
final dataset contains 7,249 statements of 246 organizations and/or 461 persons about 68
concepts from 1,879 articles between 1993 and 2001.4
5.2 Classification of actors
Actor congruence networks were exported from this dataset as described in the previous
section. Visualization of the networks was done using the software visone (Brandes and
Wagner 2004). Actors in the dataset were classified into seven categories: social actors
like trade unions, senior citizens’ interest groups, employees’ party organizations or other
social interest groups ( red color in the following analysis); liberal actors like industry or
employers’ associations, managers’ interest groups and think tanks with a market-liberal
mission statement ( yellow color ); decision-makers like governmental actors, political
3To understand how statements were encoded, consider the following fictional example: “The number
of immigrants does not affect the old-age ratio. We would have to invite 175 million people to com-
pensate for demographic change. Increasing women’s share in the labor market to generate additional
contributions should be our primary goal.” – In this case, beside the name of the person who makes
the statement and his or her organizational affiliation, the following codes would be attached to the text
portion: “immigration”–“no”, and “increase female labor participation”–“yes”.
4A list of all normative concepts as well as the list of actors and their abbreviations can be found in
a supplementary online appendix at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/psj.12007.
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parties and state agencies ( gray color ); young people ’s interest groups and party orga-
nizations ( magenta color ); financial actors like banks, insurance companies and their
interest groups and think tanks ( blue color ); scientific organizations like universities; and
“other” organizations which could not be classified into any of the previous categories
( black color ).
As Sabatier (1987) argues, scientific evidence is usually employed by advocacy coali-
tions to back up and defend their claims. Scientific organizations would thus be scattered
across all coalitions. Yet, one important aspect of the analysis is to understand which
type of actor belongs to which coalition. Mapping scientific organizations along with
the other actors in a network diagram would rather make the subsystem structure more
complex and would render this task more difficult. For this reason, they are omitted in
the network visualizations, which are part of the following analysis. However, they are
included as green nodes in the cluster analyses presented below.
6 Case study background
Demographic change poses serious challenges to established pension systems around the
globe. In coordinated market economies and beyond, an increasing number of senior citi-
zens must be sustained by a shrinking population of young people who pay contributions
into the pension system.
6.1 Characteristics of the policy subsystem
In Germany, the old-age dependency ratio, which measures the number of citizens aged
65 and over divided by those aged 15 to 64, is likely to rise until it reaches its peak around
the year 2035 (cf. Berkel et al. 2004). Taking no action would automatically increase the
contribution rate, part of the non-wage labor costs in Germany, which are jointly financed
by employers and employees. Some argue that this strong additional burden may be so
extreme that consumption is jeopardized, leading to an eventual “collapse” of the social
security system (Birg 2002; Graf von der Schulenburg and Wa¨hling 1997).
Against this background, there is pressure for reform to make pension systems more
sustainable. There are numerous alternatives and propositions of political actors and
economists as to how this can be achieved, but there is no consensus between these
actors what may be the most appropriate solution. The subsystem of pension politics
can thus be characterized as an institutionalized subsystem with demographic change
as a relatively stable parameter that provides reform incentives to actors. There is no
consensus, however, what kind of reform would be appropriate.
6.2 The 2001 Riester reform as a case of major policy change
In the German case, a path-breaking reform was passed in May 2001: the Riester reform
(named after then-minister Riester). It replaced the public pay-as-you-go pension system
by a multipillar system with private capital-funded elements (for a rough description,
see Bo¨rsch-Supan and Wilke 2003). There is scholarly consensus that – despite minor
reforms throughout the last three decades – this was the only case of major policy change
(Lamping and Ru¨b 2004; Trampusch 2008; Schma¨hl 2000; Wehlau 2009) because it in-
troduced new elements at all levels of the inherent belief system of the policy, from deep
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core to secondary aspects (“third-order change” according to Hall 1993). The reform was
a “direction setting law” which introduced only minor changes at first glance but “puts
pension policy on an irreversible track that will constrain all future governments and thus
determine all future pensions laws” (Lamping and Ru¨b 2004).
6.3 Competing reform options and policy preferences
While the reform might seem at first glance like a logical next step which could effectively
counter the threat of population aging, the situation was and still is in fact considerably
less clear. The easiest but least appropriate explanation stems from a functionalist view:
privatization and capital cover elements had to be introduced because there was the immi-
nent threat of demographic change. This explanation is flawed because many alternative
measures were discussed, whether they would be able to solve the problem or not. There
are four arguments why privatization was not necessary: (1) capital-cover elements might
have been introduced within the public pension system instead of privatizing the pen-
sion system; (2) the shift to a (partial) capital-cover system implies severe transaction
costs and intergenerational inequalities (Breyer 2000); (3) it is not clear to what extent
population aging as a dynamic phenomenon would have self-regulated the problem after
several decades; and (4) alternative pathways were equally feasible.
In the light of this complexity, politicians and scientists argued in multiple directions.
For the time period between 1993 and 2001, 68 distinct solution concepts addressing the
pension gap could be identified in the political debate.5 Besides privatizing the system in
order to yield higher returns and besides partly decoupling contributors from annuitants
by introducing a capital cover system, the following reform options or policy instruments
ranged among the more popular solution concepts: fertility incentives in order to decrease
the old-age dependency ratio (like parenting periods or tying the contribution or pension
level to the number of children someone has “produced”); immigration; capital cover
elements within the public pension system; flat rate pensions; more “gender equality”
(that is, lowering the old-age dependency ratio by having more female employees and
thus contributors); simply increasing the level of contributions; cutting the pension level;
tying the pension equation to the demographic or economic development; raising the
retirement age; including civil servants, self-employed people, low-income earners and
other groups into the pension system; increasing subsidies from the general tax budget
or replacing contributions completely; and removing intra-generative redistribution as
non-insurance elements from the PAYG system.
In other words, there was a large set of feasible policy instruments two of which sur-
vived the selection process of policy-makers. Why, then, was the pension system partly
privatized, and why did this happen in 2001? Moreover, how were the competing advo-
cacy coalitions around these policy preferences structured, and how would they change
over time?
6.4 Uncertainty, complexity, and why policy beliefs mattered
There was considerable scientific uncertainty about demographic trends (Goldstein et al.
2009; Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999; Sobotka 2004; Sobotka et al. 2011) and their under-
lying mechanisms. The literature knows at least ten different fertility theories, ranging
5A list of these concepts is provided in a supplementary online appendix at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1111/psj.12007.
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from economic modernization, culture, social networks, or neoclassic economic theory to
the rise of contraceptive technology, inter-generational wealth flows, decreasing sperm
quality at the population level, or evolutionary biology. Similarly, there is considerable
scientific disagreement about future trends of mortality, with some scholars arguing that
there is an upper bound to life expectancy and others arguing that life expectancy may
continue to increase linearly by up to 2.5 years per decade (Ney 2000; Oeppen and Vau-
pel 2002; Scherbov and Sanderson 2010). This technical complexity rendered clear policy
advice nearly impossible.
In addition, there are feedback loops which render the system potentially unlearnable.
Demographic change is a dynamic phenomenon. It gets worse until approximately 2035
and may improve afterwards. This may be the case because population aging is jointly
caused by low mortality and low fertility. Once the baby-boomers die out, they are
replaced by much smaller cohort sizes, which is likely to affect the old-age dependency
ratio in a positive way. If it is possible to survive the peak in 2035 by implementing
some of the other proposed policy instruments, their proponents argue, demography will
self-regulate the system, and the remaining rise in the contribution rate is so low that
it can be compensated by tax subsidies, by getting rid of non-insurance elements, or
by increasing the number of contributors. Similar arguments apply to some of the other
solution concepts that have been put forth: fertility incentives may increase the number of
additional contributors in the medium run but may also increase the number of pensioners
in the long run, once these children become senior citizens themselves.
In the light of this uncertainty, complexity, and feedback loops, the choice of the
appropriate course of action largely depended on policy beliefs (Sabatier 1998) rather than
objective measurement, and political discourse became the main arena for determining
what actions to take and what policy beliefs to adopt (cf. Heclo 1978; Sabatier 1987).
6.5 Belief change as a driving factor in the subsystem
Observers note that pension policy-making until the mid-1990s was determined by the so-
called “pension consensus”, a hegemonic group of governmental organizations, political
parties and trade and industry associations whose dominant policy beliefs (Sabatier 1998)
and instrument choices were not challenged in the political sphere. This pension consensus
eroded in the mid-1990s (Wehlau 2009: 93) because the number of divergent, competing
scientific conclusions on the pension problem increased substantially (Wehlau 2009: 260).
As a result, “there no longer is one pension truth, but a choice of several approaches to
understanding the pension issue: what one chooses to believe now depends on where one
stands” (Ney 2001: 34). Wehlau (2009: 259 ff.) considers the increasing activities of the
financial sector in the public discourse as the cause of this development: banks, insurance
companies, and their associations (co-) founded think tanks and research institutes like
DIA and MEA as well as internal research departments like Deutsche Bank Research,
and they made contracts with a number of previously independent researchers. This is
in line with the hypothesis of Sabatier (1987) that competing advocacy coalitions use
policy analyses and scientific expertise in order to grant credibility to their claims in the
public sphere. The result was a newly emerging diversity of views on the future of the
pension system, and eventually a diffusion of the multi-pillar idea from the financial sector,
science and pseudo-science to voters and decision-makers. Explanations for the increasing
involvement of financial actors and the changing discourse range from electoral change
(Lamping and Ru¨b 2004) over within-party politics (Trampusch 2008; Wehlau 2009) or
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changing responsibilities of goverment departments (Wehlau 2009) to the substitution of
executives in agencies or advisory committees.
Many observers note the important role that ideas, frame shifts and discursive
turnover played in this process (Hinrichs 2004; Schulze and Jochem 2007; Ney 2001)
or in German welfare state politics in general (Schmidt 2002). They attribute the
policy change in 2001 to changes in advocacy coalitions, dominant beliefs and discursive
contagion. Yet their accounts are rarely based on systematic empirical evidence and can
be better described as instances of theory-building. What they have in common is that
they hypothesize a) an erosion of the previously dominant advocacy coalition somewhere
in the mid- or late 1990s, b) the introduction of new ideas or solution concepts into the
political discourse, and c) an increased participation of actors from the financial sector in
the debate, as the drivers of the policy change that can be observed in 2001. The analysis
below will therefore fill this gap and a) provide this systematic empirical evidence, b)
quantify precisely when and how the pension consensus eroded, and c) show what kind
of advocacy coalition structure emerged in the aftermath of this erosion, what it looks
like, and why it was conducive to policy change.
7 The transition of the coalition structure
As set out in the description of the case study background, the pension reform literature
makes the following three-step prediction: in the first stage, there is a powerful and
closed advocacy coalition with a large constituency until the mid-1990s. Their views are
hardly challenged. In the second stage, after 1996, the coalition slowly erodes due to
contradictory evidence and new actors from the financial sector, who make claims about
the lack of sustainability in the statutory pension system. Consequently, the proponents
of a paradigm shift gain a larger constituency. The political discourse becomes bipolar,
with more and more actors leaving the previously dominant advocacy coalition and joining
the proponents of change. In the third stage, after the 1998 election, the old coalition
vanishes completely. The insurgent advocacy coalition has successfully installed a new
policy belief system, and the discourse becomes unipolar or centralized again, with the
pro-privatization advocacy coalition becoming the new hegemonic coalition. This gives
leeway for a pension reform introducing a paradigm shift, as intended by the financial
sector.
7.1 Three stages: hegemony, polarization, and erosion
In order to test whether these claims are justified, a cluster analysis of aggregated affili-
ation networks (see methodology section) is conducted for the three critical time periods
separately. Figure 1 shows the dendrogram of the first time period. There are two clus-
ters, but concluding from the agglomeration height, the separation between the clusters
is not particularly strong. The group on the left contains most important actors which
are classified as members of the pension consensus by the literature. The subgroup on
the right contains some other members of the pension consensus like the peak trade as-
sociation DGB, some industry associations (BDI, ZDH, BDS, ULA, DIHT) and some
financial organizations (DVAG, DB, VLVU). The fact that DGB is among the second
group supports the claim that the separation between the two clusters is not very strong.











































































































Note: Agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis of the aggregated affiliation network; Ward’s optimization; Jaccard dis-
tances; only actors with more than two statements are preserved.
Node colors and shapes: red triangles denote social actors; yellow circles denote liberal actors; blue circles denote ac-
tors from the financial market; magenta diamonds denote young people’s organizations; green diamonds denote scientific
organizations; gray rectangles denote governmental actors and parties; black rectangles denote other actors.
Figure 1: First stage, January 1, 1993 – December 31, 1995.
The second time period is depicted in Figure 2. Indeed, the coalition of system change
proponents grows as large as the previously hegemonic advocacy coalition. A variety of
financial organizations (DB, BVI, GDV, AGV, Dresdner Bank, etc.) challenges the tra-
ditional policy paradigm. The subsystem is extremely bipolar. There are some details
which can be observed beyond the predictions of the literature: numerous social actors
start to support the pension consensus in order to avert the imminent threat of privati-
zation, among them VdK, SoVD, the churches, and several trade unions. Furthermore,
and against the background of German corporatism, most major industry associations
support the status-quo-oriented coalition (BDA, DIHT, ZDH). In this stage of the polit-
ical process, the two advocacy coalitions show the highest internal congruence and the
smallest overlap between the two coalitions.
In line with the conjectures, the pro-system-change advocacy coalition supersedes the
previously hegemonic status-quo-oriented coalition in the third stage (Figure 3). It grows
much larger than the traditional advocacy coalition, has a clearly defined and congruent
core (the actors between Ludwig-Erhard-Stiftung and BMF), and the constituency now
includes the subgroup of industry associations previously supporting the PAYG coalition
(BDA, DIHT, etc.). What is more, two critical governmental actors, BMF and BMWi,
have left the PAYG coalition and joined the capital cover proponents. Likewise, the Social
Advisory Council has, due to personnel turnover, joined this coalition. The new structure
of the discourse after the 1998 election essentially entails a hegemonic pro-system-change
coalition composed of financial interests, industry interests and parts of the government
(BMF, BMWi) against a shrinking advocacy coalition of social interests, members of the
large parties, and parts of the government (BK and BMAS). The 2001 Riester reform is
thus no longer surprising, given the changes at the belief layer of the subsystem which
were already initiated in the mid-1990s by introducing divergent views on optimal policy
design into the pension discourse.
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Notes: Edge width visualizes the strength of association. The graph layout is based on a stress minimization (MDS) of
graph-theoretic distances (Brandes and Pich 2009) as implemented in the “quick layout” in visone (Brandes and Wagner
2004).
Node colors and shapes: red triangles denote social actors; yellow circles denote liberal actors; blue circles denote ac-
tors from the financial market; magenta diamonds denote young people’s organizations; green diamonds denote scientific
organizations; gray rectangles denote governmental actors and parties; black rectangles denote other actors.
Figure 4: Normalized actor congruence network in 1997 (Φ(w) ≥ 0.31).
There is yet one puzzle to solve. How can a reform be passed if the relevant veto players
(Tsebelis 1995) are still members of the shrinking, but still existing status-quo-oriented
coalition? In fact, the major parties are partisan veto players: the social-democratic party
SPD and the Green party as members of the government coalition, and the Christian-
Democrats CDU/CSU as partisan veto players in the Bundesrat, the second parliamen-
tary chamber. Moreover, the ministry in charge for pensions (BMAS) cannot be easily
superseded.
I argue that it is necessary to scale down to smaller time units in order to make the
relevant changes visible (in the remainder of this section). Figures 4 to 7 show annual
time slices of the normalized actor congruence network between 1997 and 2001. The
visualization of the year 1999 is skipped because it looks similar to the diagrams of the
surrounding years 1998 and 2000. Threshold values are set individually as to maximize
the clarity of the network structure. In the network visualizations, the coordinates of
vertices and the spatial distance between nodes cannot be interpreted in a meaningful
way. The conclusions are solely drawn on the basis of the interconnectedness of the
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Figure 5: Normalized actor congruence network in 1998 (Φ(w) ≥ 0.29). Notes: same as
in Figure 4.
nodes. As described in the methodology section, the interpretation is straightforward: the
strength of a tie between two actors reflects their normalized belief congruence. Clusters
of interconnected actors can be interpreted as advocacy coalitions because the latter are
made up of actors with overlapping policy core policy preferences (Sabatier 1998: 117).
7.2 The status quo in 1997
In 1997 (Figure 4), the extended status-quo-oriented coalition aligns with social interests,
while the system-change advocacy coalition does not exist yet. There is already a sub-
stantial number of financial (blue) actors, but they emphasize different concepts rather
than standing united in promoting system change and privatization. They are virtually
scattering all around the dominant advocacy coalition. In this early stage, the Federal
Ministry for the Economy (BMWi) aligns with liberal actors and industry interests and
does not show any overlap with the pension consensus.
The broad consensus about the future directions of pension policy is clearly visible.
In line with Sabatier (1998), however, there are two wings within this large advocacy
coalition which follow the classic corporatist labor–capital cleavage line (denoted by the
yellow nodes clustering south-west of the majority of state actors and the red nodes
which are located predominantly north-east) and which have somewhat fuzzy borders
and considerable overlap with each other. According to Sabatier (1998), this may be a
typical feature of subsystems in corporatist regimes. He also notes that in these kinds
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Figure 6: Normalized actor congruence network in 2000 (Φ(w) ≥ 0.27). Notes: same as
in Figure 4.
of subsystems, governmental actors assume strong intermediary roles as policy brokers.
The conjecture can be confirmed here because governmental actors are predominantly
located between the two camps.
7.3 Polarization between 1998 and 2000
In 1998 (Figure 5), the year of the election, the financial actors are suddenly very united
in their claims. The bipolar structure with the pension consensus on one side and the
financial sector on the other side emerges. The BMWi is now positioned within the
financial bloc and a number of liberal actors. The parties and governmental actors align
with the social actors, as before. However, a distinction between the two subcoalitions
is slightly visible, with social actors consistently being located south of the governmental
actors and parties.
In the year 2000, polarization reaches its peak. There are numerous ties within each
advocacy coalition, and between-block density is very low. BMF, BMWi, and SB have
joined the system change coalition. The government is thus divided over the pension
question. Some other actors previously known as being rather social also join the new
advocacy coalition. Among them are DAG, a major trade union, and the employees’ wing
of the BfA. The hegemony of the status-quo-defending advocacy coalition fades away, and
some early adopters switch from one coalition to the other in 2000. These observations
indicate that transitions between subsystem equilibria are not only accompanied by a
belief polarization, but also by early adopters who leave their coalition and adopt the
beliefs of the former opponent. This development leads to an erosion of the pension
consensus in late 2000 and early 2001.
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Figure 7: Normalized actor congruence network between January and May 2001 (Φ(w) ≥
0.23). Notes: same as in Figure 4.
7.4 Dissolution of the formerly hegemonic coalition and insti-
tutionalization of the new advocacy coalition
Figure 7 shows the structure of the discourse between January and May 2001. The
status-quo-oriented coalition has broken apart and is now situated at the margin of the
new dominant privatization coalition, in some cases even bridging the housing and the
insurance wing of the system change coalition. The chancellor (BK) has left his orig-
inal coalition completely and joins the insurance cluster. Similarly, the association of
the German statutory pension insurance scheme (VDR) joins the financial coalition and
abandons its discursive ties to other governmental actors almost completely. Surprisingly,
even the social actors are now dispersed all around the new dominant coalition. At the
lower end, a small clique of social actors connects both to the chancellor and to the finan-
cial sector. Other social actors reside at various locations in the discourse (CDA, DAG,
IG BAU); they are largely disconnected from the governmental actors with whom they
used to share many basic premises of how the pension system should be designed.
7.5 Significance for the pension reform literature
How do these observations fit into previous accounts of German pension politics? Besides
providing further evidence for the dominance of the newly established coalition right
before the Riester reform was adopted, the main conclusion from these observations is
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that core decision-makers and veto players like the chancellor, the major parties, and
the relevant federal ministries switched from their old coalition to the newly established
coalition and thus gave leeway to the reform. A clear pattern of structural change at
the level of policy preferences could be identified prior to the reform in 2001: a single
hegemonic advocacy coalition until 1997, the emergence of a second advocacy coalition
from 1998 onwards, a strong bipolarization of the discourse with an increasing number of
critical political actors leaving their old coalition due to credibility problems of the old
paradigm, and a complete erosion of the old coalition and attachment of their members
to the new hegemonic advocacy coalition. This constitutes a shift from one normal state
of policy-making until 1997 to a new normal state of policy-making after 2000, with a
polarization phase in the meantime. Only after this process was finished, the reform
was adopted. This lends new credibility to the argument that changes in the political
discourse led to the reform and specifies clearly how and when these changes came about.
8 Reconnecting the findings to the ACF
A clear transition pattern between a single hegemonic advocacy coalition until 1997 and
another hegemonic advocacy coalition from 2001 on can be be identified in the case study.
Between these equilibria, there is a transition phase in which both coalitions co-exist and
the subsystem becomes more and more polarized.
8.1 Early adopters and learning across coalitions
Once polarization has taken off, the erosion of the old coalition starts with some early
adopters who leave their old coalition and join the political opponent. These are usually
agencies or decision-makers rather than vested interest groups. This process resembles a
bandwagon effect (Nadeau et al. 1993). The reason for this behavior may be manifold:
in some cases outlined above, the directors or heads of an organization were replaced
indirectly by members of the new coalition (SB, BMF); in other cases, policy learning
across coalitions due to the discursive activity of the financial sector coalition may explain
this shift (BfA-AN, DAG). In any case, these changing coalition memberships lent more
credibility to the claims of the newly established coalition and presumably contributed
to the erosion of the pension consensus coalition. Both processes – polarization and
learning – interacted and had a disintegrating effect on the belief system inherent in the
status-quo-oriented coalition. These results have implications for the ACF.
8.2 A single hegemonic coalition
Normal policy-making in the case study under scrutiny seems to be determined by a single
hegemonic advocacy coalition rather than a competition between two or more coalitions.
Such a competition can only be found in the relatively short transition phase between
two subsystem equilibria or “normal states” of policy-making. How can this finding be
explained?
One possibility – as vaguely set out by Sabatier and Weible (2007: 199) – is that the
ACF was previously too pluralism-centric, and that corporatist systems work differently.
Nonetheless, while the typical corporatist patterns of fuzzy coalitions with brokers in
between (Sabatier and Weible 2007: 200) are observable in 1997 and, to a lesser extent,
within coalitions in the other years, other studies in corporatist political systems have
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found a prevalence of competing coalitions (for an overview of studies and their geographic
setting, see Sabatier 1998: 100), which indicates that more fine-grained institutional
differences between subsystems than the simple corporatism–pluralism dimension are
likely to account for this variation.
In this perspective, the variation could be related to differences between subsystems
or policy sectors rather than polities at large (cf. Lowi 1972). Old-age security is a typical
redistributive policy sector, in which the state collects taxes and redistributes them to
other individuals. In other words, state authorities have a prevalent role in this kind of
subsystem. In contrast, regulative policy sectors like telecommunication or environmental
policy are characterized by the surveillance of market or private actors by the state.
Regulatory interventions are only made if the provision of infrastructures or public goods
is inefficient. Regulative policy subsystems may thus be more prone to competition
by interest groups than redistributive subsystems. Hence, in redistributive subsystems
like old-age security, policy change may be characterized by a transition between stable
hegemonic coalitions, with polarization and learning across coalitions occurring in the
transition phase, while regulative subsystems may be characterized by the competition
of advocacy coalitions as confirmed by numerous studies. In fact, most ACF applications
were conducted in policy sectors with a highly regulatory character (for an early overview,
see Sabatier 1998: 100), which is why most studies could confirm the original predictions.
The ACF allows for this possibility – albeit with a different predicted pattern –, but
does not pursue it any further: “subsystem dynamics may vary by policy type [. . . ]. For
example, one might expect regulatory and redistributive subsystems to be characterized
by multiple coalitions, while distributive policies may usually have a single (pork-barrel)
coalition except during periods when cost-bearers (e.g. taxpayers or environmentalists)
are activated” (Sabatier 1988: 159).
Future research may shed more light on these open questions, in particular on why
some subsystems are characterized by competition and others by hegemony and whether
redistribution versus regulation can explain this difference.
8.3 Transitions and major policy change
Furthermore, the case study presented above suggests that a transition between two
normal states or subsystem equilibria may be required for major policy change to occur.
In the case of a single hegemonic coalition, the transition phase features two interrelated
processes: polarization and learning across coalitions (where learning is a result of the
polarization that has already begun).
This leaves several interesting questions to be explored by future research: is the
transition observed here a general pattern in subsystems with a hegemonic coalition, or
is this an idiosyncratic case? Is there a similar transition phase in subsystems with two
or more competing coalitions? And what does such a realignment in pluralist subsystems
look like at the discursive level?
Moreover, the reasons why a transition is initiated in the first place must be disen-
tangled. The ACF allows for external perturbations to initiate learning processes across
coalitions, hence leading to major policy change. As it seems, in subsystems with a sin-
gle hegemonic coalition, polarization is a necessary additional mechanism that must take
place before learning occurs. What are the mechanisms that trigger polarization? In
the pension subsystem analyzed above, the literature suggests several institutional forces
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ranging from the national election in 1998 over party politics to substitution of agency
executives (see the case study background section).
9 Conclusion
This article presents two key findings. First, it shows how major policy change comes
about. In the case study of German pension politics, preference polarization and shifting
coalition memberships of early adopters have been pinpointed at the level of policy beliefs
(the “discursive” level) as necessary conditions for third-order policy change to happen.
The Riester reform in 2001 was predated by a shift from one hegemonic advocacy coalition
to a bipolarization and finally to the replacement of the former by a new dominant
advocacy coalition. In this process, some key actors (“early adopters”) switched their
affiliation over time, initiating a diffusion process and culminating in an erosion of the
pension consensus.
Second, discourse network analysis is presented as a viable measurement instrument
for the analysis of policy debates over time. The approach is able to graph relational
changes at the level of policy core policy preferences and hence the belief component of
advocacy coalitions and subsystems.
The results presented here also make a genuinely new contribution to the analysis
of German pension politics in the public policy literature. For the first time, the often-
hypothesized ideational changes among actors were operationalized in a systematic way.
But more importantly, the results may have implications for other policy subsystems
and other polities. Is policy change in subsystems always predated by a discursive po-
larization which looks like the one identified here? – Or may this pattern of polarization
covary with redistributive versus regulative policy subsystems or other factors like tech-
nical complexity, moral tension, institutionalization of the policy sector, the existence of
a discursive forum like a widely-read newspaper, or other variables related to the subsys-
tem under scrutiny? Under what conditions is “normal” (that is, stable) policy-making
accompanied by the presence of only one hegemonic coalition, as witnessed here, and
under what circumstances is politics over a decade or more multipolar and conflictual, as
suggested by the ACF (Sabatier 1998)? Do governmental actors usually act as bridges,
or “brokers” (Sabatier 1998), between advocacy coalitions when a normal-state discourse
is multipolar, or is this pattern more prevalent within dominant coalitions in corporatist
settings, as the results in 1997 imply (see also Sabatier and Weible 2007: 200)? And
finally, what rational, boundedly rational and cognitive mechanisms can explain why ac-
tors contribute certain solution concepts to the public debate at certain points in time?
The toolbox of social network analysis and in particular the approach of discourse net-
work analysis can help to answer questions like these. It facilitates the operationalization
of the apparently ill-defined phenomenon of political discourse and opens up a new and
previously inaccessible research agenda.
A The discourse network model in matrix notation
The descriptive discourse network model was presented in graph-theoretic notation. For
the sake of clarity, the model is presented in matrix notation in this appendix.
The information encoded in a collection of articles can be represented by a four-




This array can be broken down into a set of affiliation matrices for each time point and
each relation separately: Xr,t
m×n
. In such an affiliation matrix, actors occupy the row labels
and concepts the column labels. A cell entry of xij = 1 denotes that actor i refers to
concept j in a certain way (relation r) during time period t. A cell entry of xij = 0
denotes that actor i does not refer to concept j in the specified way during t.





This yields an m×m square co-occurrence matrix with the edge weights as the cell entries
– for each of the two agreement relations separately. Next, the matrices for the different
agreement relations must be combined into a single matrix Yat . This can be simply done











In order to normalize the edge weights stored in Yat , one first has to generate an aggregated
affiliation matrix by adding up the two separate agreement relations. The resulting matrix





This matrix must be dichotomized, i e., non-zero elements must be recoded as 1:
∀xij : xdichij =
{
1 if xij > 0
0 if xij = 0
(11)
In the dichotomized, aggregated affiliation matrix Xdicht , let x
dich
i• denote the row sum of





A weighted edge yij in the congruence network Y
a
t , as defined in equation 9, can then be
normalized by dividing it by the average row sum (in the affiliation matrix) for row actor
i and column actor j in the congruence matrix, which is equivalent to equation 7:
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1 List of concepts in the dataset




• Extend capital-covered provisional fund
• Include other assets in contributions
• Increase contribution assessment ceiling
• Increase contributions
• Increase employees’ share of contributions
• Introduce a ceiling for pension entitlements
• Let employees participate in company’s annual profits
• Machine tax
• Subtract assets from pension level
• Tax life insurances
• Tax pensions
• Tie pension formula to economic development
• Use surplus of health care insurance
Strengthening the insurance principle
• Cut back invalidity or widows’ pensions
• Cut back the administrative apparatus
• Extend pension entitlements for parenting periods
• Grant pension entitlements for educational periods
• Grant pension entitlements for military or alternative service
• Grant pension entitlements to ethnic German emigrants
• Grant pension entitlements to forced laborers
1
• Insure periods without contributions
• Minimum pension
• Regionalize the pension system
• Remove non-insurance benefits
• Use pension system to finance German reunification
Increasing the number of contributors




• Fight early retirement
• Fight unemployment
• Grant pension entitlements to volunteers
• Immigration
• Include clerks in the pension system
• Include low-income earners in the pension system
• Include pseudo self-employed people in the pension system
• Include self-employed people in the pension system
• Increase female labor participation
• Increase fertility
• Increase retirement age
• Increase working life
• Increase working life by decreasing number of school years
• Link contribution or pension level to number of children
• Reduce supplementary pensions




• Capital market risk
• Compensate for double burden by increasing public debt
• Compulsory contributions
• Contribution-based PAYG system
• Convert working time accounts into old-age provision
• Double burden during transition
• Effort-based pensions
• Flat rate pensions
• Full transition to a private capital cover system
• Manipulation by politicians
• Occupational pensions
• Occupational pensions – Direct insurance
• Occupational pensions – Direct commitment
• Occupational pensions – Employee funds
• Occupational pensions – Relief funds
• Occupational pensions – Pension funds
• Occupational pensions – Mediate system
• Partial transition to a private capital cover system
• Promote home ownership
• Returns are higher in a capital cover system
• Subsidies from the national budget
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2 List of actors in the dataset
ABA Arbeitsgemeinschaft fu¨r betriebliche Altersversorgung [financial]
ABV Arbeitsgemeinschaft berufssta¨ndischer Versorgungseinrichtungen e. V. [liberal]
ACC American Chamber of Commerce in Germany e. V. [liberal]
AG-GesM Gesamtmetall. Die Arbeitgeberverba¨nde der Metall- und Elektro-Industrie [liberal]
AG-K Arbeitgeberverband Kautschuk [liberal]
AGAWP Arbeitsgruppe Alternative Wirtschaftspolitik – Memorandum-Gruppe – Memogruppe [science]
AGP Arbeitsgemeinschaft Partnerschaft in der Wirtschaft e. V. [liberal]
AGV Arbeitgeberverband der Versicherungsunternehmen in Deutschland [financial]
AK-BPF Arbeitskreis Betriebliche Pensionsfonds (Gerke-Kommission) [science]
AOK AOK-Bundesverband [financial]
ARGE Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Forschungsinstitute e. V. [science]
ASF Arbeitsgemeinschaft Sozialdemokratischer Frauen [social]
ASU Arbeitsgemeinschaft Selbsta¨ndiger Unternehmer e. V. [liberal]
Allianz Allianz [financial]
Awo Arbeiterwohlfahrt [social]
BA Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit [governmental]
BAG Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Mittel- und Großbetriebe des Einzelhandels e. V. [liberal]
BAVC Bundesarbeitgeberverband Chemie [liberal]
BBS Bundesverband Baustoffe, Steine und Erden [liberal]
BDA Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverba¨nde e. V. [liberal]
BDF Bundesverband Deutscher Fertigbau [financial]
BDH Bundesvereinigung Deutscher Handelsverba¨nde [liberal]
BDI Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e. V. [liberal]
BDS Der Bund der Selbsta¨ndigen/Deutscher Gewerbeverband [liberal]
BDZV Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger e. V. [liberal]
BFS Bundesverband der Filialbetriebe und Selbstbedienungs-Warenha¨user [liberal]
BFW Bundesverband Freier Immobilien- und Wohnungsunternehmen e. V. [financial]
BGA Bundesverband Großhandel, Außenhandel, Dienstleistungen e. V. [liberal]
BJU Bundesverband Junger Unternehmer (Die Jungen Unternehmer) [liberal]
BK Bundeskanzler und Bundeskanzleramt [governmental]
BKU Bund Katholischer Unternehmer e. V. [liberal]
BMAS Bundesministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Soziales [governmental]
BMF Bundesministerium der Finanzen [governmental]
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BMF-WBR Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesfinanzministerium [science]
BMFSFJ Bundesministerium fu¨r Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend [governmental]
BMG Bundesministerium fu¨r Gesundheit [governmental]
BMVBW Bundesministerium fu¨r Verkehr, Bau- und Wohnungswesen [governmental]
BMWi Bundesministerium fu¨r Wirtschaft und Technologie [governmental]
BMWi-WBR Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium fu¨r Wirtschaft und Technologie [science]
BRH Bund der Ruhestandsbeamten, Rentner und Hinterbliebenen [social]
BSZK Bayerisch-Sa¨chsische Zukunftskommission [science]
BSozG Bundessozialgericht [governmental]
BVI Bundesverband Deutscher Investment-Gesellschaften e. V. (Bundesverband Investment und Asset Management e. V.)
[financial]
BVK Bundesverband Deutscher Versicherungs-Kaufleute [financial]
BVKS Bundesvereinigung der kommunalen Spitzenverba¨nde [other]
BVdB Ausschuß fu¨r Wirtschafts- und Wa¨hrungspolitik im Bundesverband deutscher Banken [financial]
BVerfG Bundesverfassungsgericht [governmental]
Bau-AG Bau-Arbeitgeber [liberal]
Bausparkasse Schwa¨bisch Hall AG Bausparkasse Schwa¨bisch Hall AG [financial]
Bayer AG Bayer AG [liberal]
BdB Bundesverband deutscher Banken [financial]
BdSt Bund der Steuerzahler e. V. [other]
BdV Bund der Versicherten [social]
Bertelsmann Stiftung Bertelsmann Stiftung [liberal]
BfA Bundesversicherungsanstalt fu¨r Angestellte [governmental]
BfA-AG Bundesversicherungsanstalt fu¨r Angestellte; Arbeitgeberflu¨gel [liberal]
BfA-AN Bundesversicherungsanstalt fu¨r Angestellte; Arbeitnehmerflu¨gel [social]
BfB Bundesverband der Freien Berufe [liberal]
Buba Deutsche Bundesbank [governmental]
Bundesknappschaft Bundesknappschaft [governmental]
Bundesrechnungshof Bundesrechnungshof [governmental]
Burda Burda Druck GmbH [liberal]
CAWM Centrum fu¨r angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung [science]
CDA Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft [social]
CDH Centralvereinigung Deutscher Wirtschaftsverba¨nde fu¨r Handelsvermittlung und Vertrieb [liberal]
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands [governmental]
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CDU-FU Frauenunion [social]
CDU-JG CDU - Junge Gruppe [young]
CDU-JU Junge Union [young]
CDU-MIT Mittelstands- und Wirtschaftsvereinigung der CDU/CSU [liberal]
CDU-SU Senioren-Union [social]
CDU-WR CDU-Wirtschaftsrat [liberal]
CKAG Colonia Konzern Aktiengesellschaft [financial]
CSU Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e. V. [governmental]
Cardiff University Cardiff University [science]
Colonia Nordstern LV Colonia Nordstern Lebensversicherungen [financial]
Columbia University Columbia University in the City of New York [science]
Continentale VG Continentale Versicherungs-Gruppe [financial]
DAG Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft [social]
DAI Deutsches Aktieninstitut [financial]
DAK Deutsche Angestellten-Krankenkasse [financial]
DB Deutsche Bank AG [financial]
DB Research Deutsche Bank Research [financial]
DBBu Deutscher Beamtenbund [other]
DBV Winterthur DBV Winterthur [financial]
DCV Deutscher Caritasverband e. V. [social]
DEHOGA Deutsche Hotel- und Gaststa¨ttenverband e. V. [liberal]
DFV Deutscher Familienverband e. V. [social]
DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund [social]
DGVN Deutsche Gesellschaft fu¨r die Vereinten Nationen [other]
DGZ-Deka-Bank, Frankfurt DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale [financial]
DIA Deutsche Institut fu¨r Altersvorsorge [financial]
DIHT Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag [liberal]
DIS Deutsche Industrie Service AG [liberal]
DIT Deutscher Investment Trust Gesellschaft fu¨r Wertpapieranlagen mbH [financial]
DIW Berlin Deutsches Institut fu¨r Wirtschaftsforschung [science]
DSGV Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband [financial]
DST Deutscher Sta¨dtetag [other]
DStGB Deutscher Sta¨dte- und Gemeindebund [other]
DVAG Deutsche Vermo¨gensberatung AG [financial]
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DVfVW Deutscher Verein fu¨r Versicherungswissenschaft e. V. [financial]
DWS Investment GmbH DWS Investment GmbH [financial]
DeuBiKo Deutsche Bischofskonferenz [social]
Deutscher Frauenrat Deutscher Frauenrat e. V. [social]
Deutscher Juristentag Deutscher Juristentag [other]
Dresdner Bank Dresdner Bank AG [financial]
EKD Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland [social]
EZB Europa¨ische Zentralbank [other]
Enquete-Kommission Enquete-Kommission Demographischer Wandel, 1992–2002 [governmental]
Ergo Versicherungsgruppe AG ERGO Versicherungsgruppe AG [financial]
Europa-Versicherungen Europa-Versicherungen [financial]
Europa¨ische Kommission Europa¨ische Kommission [other]
Evangelisches Siedlungswerk Evangelisches Siedlungswerk in Deutschland e. V. [financial]
FAZ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [other]
FDK Familienbund der Katholiken [social]
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei [governmental]
FES-Managerkreis Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Managerkreis [liberal]
Fidelity Investments Fidelity Investments [financial]
Fitch IBCA Fitch Ratings [financial]
GDV Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft [financial]
GVE Gemeinschaftsverband des Deutschen Einzelhandels [liberal]
GdW Bundesverband deutscher Wohnungs- und Immobilienunternehmen [financial]
Gesamttextil Gesamttextil e. V. - Dachverband der deutschen Textilindustrie [liberal]
Gevaert Gevaert Photo-Producten, N. V. [liberal]
Goldman, Sachs und Co. Goldman, Sachs und Co. [financial]
Gru¨ne Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen [governmental]
HBV Gewerkschaft Handel, Banken und Versicherungen [social]
HDB Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie e. V. [financial]
HDE Handelsverband Deutschland e. V. - Der Einzelhandel [liberal]
HDH Hauptverband der Deutschen Holz und Kunststoffe verarbeitenden Industrie und verwandter Industriezweige [liberal]
HU Berlin Humboldt-Universita¨t Berlin [science]
HWWA Hamburgisches Welt-Wirtschafts-Archiv; HWWA-Institut fu¨r Wirtschaftsforschung [science]
Haus und Grund Zentralverband der Deutschen Haus-, Wohnungs- und Grundeigentu¨mer e. V. [financial]
Heubeck-Feri Pension Asset Consulting Heubeck-Feri Pension Asset Consulting [financial]
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IG BAU Industriegewerkschaft Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt [social]
IG BCE Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, Energie [social]
IG Medien Industriegewerkschaft Medien – Druck und Papier, Publizistik und Kunst [social]
IGM Industriegewerkschaft Metall [social]
IHK Ko¨ln Industrie- und Handelskammer Ko¨ln [liberal]
IW Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Ko¨ln e. V. [liberal]
IWF Internationaler Wa¨hrungsfonds [other]
IWG Institut fu¨r Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Bonn e. V. [liberal]
IWH Institut fu¨r Wirtschaftsforschung Halle [science]
IZA Institut zur Zukunft der Arbeit [science]
Iduna/Nova Iduna/Nova [financial]
IfW Institut fu¨r Weltwirtschaft an der Universita¨t Kiel [science]
Ifo ifo Institut fu¨r Wirtschaftsforschung e. V. [science]
Initiative fu¨r Deutschland Initiative fu¨r Deutschland [liberal]
Initiative pro Handelsvertreter Initiative pro Handelsvertreter [liberal]
Institut Finanzen und Steuern Institut Finanzen und Steuern, Bonn [science]
J. P. Morgan J. P. Morgan [financial]
J.M. Voith AG J.M. Voith AG [liberal]
JDW Junge Deutsche Wirtschaft [young]
JuLi Junge Liberale [young]
KDFB Katholischer Deutscher Frauenbund [social]
KFD Katholische Frauengemeinschaft Deutschlands [social]
KOS Koordinierungsstelle gewerkschaftlicher Arbeitslosengruppen [social]
KSD Katholischer Siedlungsdienst e. V. – Bundesverband fu¨r Wohnungswesen und Sta¨dtebau [financial]
Kirchen [social]
Kronberger Kreis Kronberger Kreis; Frankfurter Institut; Stiftung Marktwirtschaft [liberal]
LBS BW Landesbausparkasse Baden-Wu¨rttemberg [financial]
LBS Hessen-Thu¨ringen Landesbausparkasse Hessen-Thu¨ringen [financial]
LMU Mu¨nchen Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t Mu¨nchen [science]
LZB H, MV, SH Landeszentralbank Hamburg, Meckl.-Vorp. und Schleswig-Holst. [financial]
LZB Thu¨ringen und Sachsen Landeszentralbank Thu¨ringen und Sachsen [financial]
Ludwig-Erhard-Stiftung Ludwig-Erhard-Stiftung e. V. [liberal]
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology [science]
MLP AG Marschollek, Lautenschla¨ger und Partner AG [financial]
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MPI-SR Max-Planck-Institut fu¨r Sozialrecht [science]
MPIfG, Ko¨ln Max-Planck-Institut fu¨r Gesellschaftsforschung [science]
Metzler B. Metzler seel. Sohn & Co. Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien [financial]
Morgan Stanley Morgan Stanley Dean Witter [financial]
NGG Gewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststa¨tten [social]
OECD Organisation fu¨r wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung [other]
PDS Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus [governmental]
PR-Gruppe, Waiblingen PR-Gruppe, Waiblingen [liberal]
PVZ Provinzial [financial]
Pensions Institute Pensions Institute [science]
Piepenbrock Piepenbrock-Unternehmensgruppe, Osnabru¨ck [liberal]
RB Roland Berger & Partner [liberal]
RWI Rheinisch-Westfa¨lisches Institut fu¨r Wirtschaftsforschung [science]
SB Sozialbeirat [governmental]
SGZ-Bank Su¨dwestdeutschen Genossenschafts-Zentralbank AG, Frankfurt [financial]
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands [governmental]
SPD-60p Arbeitsgemeinschaft SPD 60 plus [social]
SPD-AGS Arbeitsgemeinschaft Selbsta¨ndige in der SPD [liberal]
SPD-AfA Arbeitsgemeinschaft fu¨r Arbeitnehmerfragen in der SPD [social]
SPD-Jusos Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Jungsozialistinnen und Jungsozialisten in der SPD [young]
SVR Sachversta¨ndigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung [science]
Siemens AG Siemens AG [liberal]
SoVD Sozialverband Deutschland e. V. [social]
TU Berlin Technische Universita¨t Berlin [science]
Thilenius Management AG Thilenius Management AG [liberal]
Thyssen Thyssen Stahl AG [liberal]
Tierschutzpartei Partei Mensch Umwelt Tierschutz [governmental]
UG UnternehmensGru¨n e. V. [liberal]
ULA Union Leitender Angestellter [liberal]
Uni Bamberg Otto-Friedrich-Universita¨t Bamberg [science]
Uni Bielefeld Universita¨t Bielefeld [science]
Uni Bonn Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universita¨t Bonn [science]
Uni Bremen Universita¨t Bremen [science]
Uni Erlangen-Nu¨rnberg Friedrich-Alexander-Universita¨t Erlangen-Nu¨rnberg [science]
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Uni Frankfurt Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universita¨t Frankfurt am Main [science]
Uni Freiburg Albert-Ludwigs-Universita¨t Freiburg [science]
Uni Heidelberg Ruprecht-Karls-Universita¨t Heidelberg [science]
Uni Hohenheim Universita¨t Hohenheim [science]
Uni Kiel Christian-Albrechts-Universita¨t zu Kiel [science]
Uni Konstanz Universita¨t Konstanz [science]
Uni Ko¨ln Universita¨t zu Ko¨ln [science]
Uni Magdeburg Otto-von-Guericke-Universita¨t Magdeburg [science]
Uni Mainz Johannes Gutenberg-Universita¨t Mainz [science]
Uni Mannheim Universita¨t Mannheim [science]
Uni Wu¨rzburg Julius-Maximilians-Universita¨t Wu¨rzburg [science]
Union-Investment-Gesellschaft mbH Union-Investment-Gesellschaft mbH [financial]
Universita¨t Frankfurt (Oder) Europa-Universita¨t Viadrina [science]
Universita¨t Halle-Wittenberg Martin-Luther-Universita¨t Halle-Wittenberg [science]
Universita¨t Hannover Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universita¨t Hannover [science]
Universita¨t Tu¨bingen Eberhard Karls Universita¨t Tu¨bingen [science]
Universtity of Chicago Universtity of Chicago [science]
VDH Verband deutscher Hypothekenbanken [financial]
VDM Verband der Deutschen Mo¨belindustrie [liberal]
VDMA Verband Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau [liberal]
VDR Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungstra¨ger [governmental]
VLVU Verband der Lebensversicherungsunternehmen e. V. [financial]
VMU Vereinigung Mittelsta¨ndischer Unternehmer [liberal]
VPRT Verband Privater Rundfunk und Telemedien [liberal]
VW Volkswagen AG [liberal]
VdK Sozialverband VdK Deutschland e. V. [social]
Veba AG Veba AG [liberal]
Verband o¨ffentlicher Versicherer Verband o¨ffentlicher Versicherer [financial]
Verdi Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft [social]
Verein fu¨r Socialpolitik Verein fu¨r Socialpolitik [liberal]
Victoria Lebensversicherung Victoria Versicherungs-Gesellschaften [financial]
Volksfu¨rsorge Holding AG Volksfu¨rsorge Holding AG [financial]
WB Weltbank [other]
WIG Industrieinstandhaltung WIG Industrieinstandhaltung GmbH, Ko¨ln [liberal]
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WJD Wirtschaftsjunioren Deutschlands [young]
Wimatik GmbH WiMatik Wirtschaftsmathematik GmbH [liberal]
ZDB Zentralverband des Deutschen Baugewerbes [financial]
ZDH Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks e. V. [liberal]
ZEW Zentrum fu¨r Europa¨ische Wirtschaftsforschung [science]
ZdK Zentralkomitee der deutschen Katholiken [social]
Zukunftskommission Gesellschaft 2000 Zukunftskommission Gesellschaft 2000 [science]
vhw Deutsches Volksheimsta¨ttenwerk [liberal]
O¨TV Gewerkschaft o¨ffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr [social]
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